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1. Introduction
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the consequences of competitive rivalry in
a situation without formal contracting possibilities. Our study builds upon the idea that
(social) preferences and tastes may not be independent of the institutional environment.
For instance, Bowles (1998) argues that different kinds of institutions may affect values,
tastes and personalities. A particularly important issue he discusses is closely related to
the concern about the effect that rivalry can have on well-being. In his own words: “(...)
there are significant differences in the personality effects on participants in markets (...) for
people on the short side (...) and those on the long side of the market, some of which are
simply excluded from the exchange process, while others fear losing the transactions they have
secured.” (Bowles, 1998, p. 78) This statement suggests that people’s well-being is influenced
by the competitiveness of the environment and the side one is on in such an environment.1
There are several reasons why it is important to investigate the relationship between
competitive rivalry and well-being. For one, well-being and happiness are undoubtedly central
goals in human life.2 This by itself is an important reason for studying their relation to
different economic institutions. In addition, there is considerable evidence that supports the
premise that satisfaction with process and procedures is an important ingredient of human
motivation.3 The degree of competitiveness may be viewed as one aspect of the procedure
under which interaction takes place. Beyond these direct consequences of rivalry on well-
being there are potentially also derived consequences. Specifically, interacting under rivalry
may change people’s disposition towards others and, in particular, towards those individuals
they have encountered in the interaction, and whom they may meet again in the future.
These potential effects of rivalry have not received much attention in economics, but need to
be studied in order to get a more complete picture of the impact of rivalry on economic and
social life. We investigate both the direct as well as the derived effects of rivalry on well-being.
A stream of theoretical studies—initiated by Akerlof’s (1970) seminal ‘Lemons Market’
paper—has shown that competition does not guarantee allocative efficiency in environments
that are characterized by contractual incompleteness (cf. Klein and Leﬄer, 1981; Levin, 2003).
1In a similar vein, Rabin (1993, p. 1283) argues that: “Welfare economics should be concerned not only
with the efficient allocation of material goods, but also with designing institutions such that people are happy
about the way they interact with others.”
2Kahneman et al. (1999) provide a wealth of information about the importance of well-being (see also,
Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Krueger 2005; and McFadden 2005).
3Kahneman et al. (1986), Barret-Howard and Tyler (1986), and Bies et al. (1993) find that procedural
information influences judgments of market exploitation. Charness and Levine (2000) find that perceived
fairness of a layoff is highly dependent on the manner in which the layoff is implemented and Bolton et al.
(2005) show that different random procedures affect choice behavior.
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Experimental studies of exchange situations where formal contracts are incomplete or absent
have corroborated this view and, moreover, shown that the validity of economic analysis based
on standard assumptions of narrow selfishness and rationality may be considerably limited
(Fehr et al., 1993, 1998; Fehr et al., 1997; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Hannan et al., 2002; Brown et
al., 2004; Brandts and Charness, 2004). These studies have greatly increased our knowledge
about the problems and possible solutions of exchange situations without complete contracts.
However, there is still a lack of knowledge and evidence of the effect of rivalry per se in such
contract situations.
Our experimental design allows us to control for the effects of rivalry as such, in an envi-
ronment with incomplete contracting. We compare subjects’ behavior in several experimental
conditions with rivalry and in one condition without rivalry, while holding all other aspects
of the economic environment constant. In our design it is completely transparent whether
one is interacting under rivalry or not, and it appears in such a way that it is always clear
who is on the long or short side of the interaction. Another important feature of our design is
that we collect data about participants’ subjective well-being and disposition towards others,
which allows us to study the impact of rivalry on well-being and disposition towards others in
a controlled way. In the environments with rivalry we can also distinguish between effects on
the short and on the long side of the interaction. We further study how subjective well-being
and disposition towards others are related to interaction success in the different conditions.
2. Design and Procedures
Our experimental set-up consists of one condition without rivalry and three conditions
with rivalry, each consisting of three parts. In part 1 subjects make decisions in the circle-
test, a task designed to elicit people’s initial disposition towards others. Part 2 is a finitely
repeated social dilemma game played by a fixed group of subjects under different rivalry
conditions. In part 3, we measure the repercussions of what occurs in the interactive phase,
by eliciting participants’ subjective general well-being and experienced emotions, followed by
a second application of the circle test measuring subjects’ post-interaction disposition towards
their interaction partners. Table 1 depicts the sequence of events. In the following we present
each of these parts in detail. The four conditions differ with respect to the interactive game
played in part 2. We, therefore, start with the description of this part.
Part 2 - The interactive game:. In this part we compare behavior in four environments: one
without rivalry and three different ones with rivalry. In the No Rivalry Condition (hereafter
NRC) the repeated game is played in a dyad, by a pair of fixed partners, labeled A and B. In
contrast, in the three Rivalry Conditions (hereafter RCs), the game involves a triad of fixed
players with fixed roles: A, B and C (cf. Davis and Holt, 1994). Such ongoing relationships,
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Table 1: Sequence of events
0. General information → experiment consists of three parts
PART 1
1. Instructions for first circle test only
2. Circle test measuring disposition towards random stranger
PART 2
3. Instructions for interactive game
in NRC in RC-90, RC-90DC or RC-10
4. Interaction in dyad Interaction in triad
PART 3
5. Measurement of general subjective well-being
6. Measurement of specific emotions
7. Instructions for second circle test
in NRC in RC-90, RC-90DC or RC-10
8. Circle test measuring disposition Circle test measuring disposition
towards partner and random stranger towards both interaction partners
which are characteristic of many if not most market and organizational environments, are the
natural context in which to study the issues at hand. It opens the possibility for the creation
of emotional and social ties (Lawler et al., 1995; van Dijk and van Winden, 1997) and for more
general psychological effects of rivalry to accumulate over time. The three rivalry conditions
will be denoted by RC-90, RC-90DC and RC-10 for reasons that will be explained shortly.
In all four conditions the number of repetitions (rounds) is 30. In each round of the game
of the three RCs the subject in the role of A has to choose to play either with B or with
C. Since player A can only choose one of the other two players the situation of players with
roles B and C is one of rivalry as defined by Stigler (1987), who writes, that “competition is a
rivalry between individuals (or groups or nations), and it arises whenever two or more parties
strive for something that all cannot obtain” (p. 531). Thus, the RCs reflect in a simple but
effective way the kind of rivalry we want to study.4
The stage game of the repeated social dilemma game implemented in part 2 is shown in
Figure 1. The representation corresponds directly to the NRC condition, where the game is
played by two fixed partners, A and B. In each round the two players simultaneously choose
between the numbers 0 and 10. The choice possibilities represent ‘cooperation’ and ‘no
cooperation’ in a social dilemma situation and may be interpreted as, e.g., wage and effort
choices in a gift-exchange framework or quality and price choices in markets of experience
goods. Below, we refer to the choices in terms of (rates of) cooperation.
4With this design we capture the essential aspects of competitive rivalry. However, we do not claim to
examine all potentially interesting facets of competition. In particular, we do not deal with the kind of full-
fledged atomistic competition involving a large number of participants that is often studied in economics. We
also do not study other potentially important features of competition like how it contributes to an efficient
allocation of resources by leading to trade by high-valuation buyers and low-cost sellers.
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The RCs involve one more choice for one of the players. In each round of these conditions,
player A also chooses between two partners, B and C. Player A and the chosen partner then
play the above game while the not chosen player obtains a fixed payment. The unchosen
player is not informed about the outcome of the interaction between the A player and the
chosen player. The B and C labels are kept constant throughout the interaction so that A
can trace the history of B’s and C’s play. Note that at the outset the B and C players are
identical.
0 10
0 160, 160 410, 40
10 40, 410 290, 290
In RC-90 and RC-90DC the player not chosen receives 90,
in RC-10 the player not chosen receives 10.
Figure 1: The stage game
The fact that both A and the chosen partner can freely choose their action in a round
represents the absence of formal contracting on both sides of the relation. We consider this
to be more interesting than the case of one-sided completeness in which one side’s responsi-
bilities are completely fixed. It also makes the players symmetric with respect to the choice
possibilities. This is a desirable feature because we want to isolate the effect of rivalry from
possible influences related to choice or payoff asymmetries. This is also the reason why the
players are symmetric with respect to the payoffs. This symmetry facilitates a straightforward
comparison of behavior and earnings across different conditions and player types.
The three conditions with rivalry differ with respect to the timing of the B/C choices and
the value of the payoff that the unchosen player obtains. In our RC-90 condition subjects in
the role of B and C made their choice before they knew whether they had been chosen by
A and the unchosen B/C player obtained a payoff of 90. This choice procedure for B and
C yields more information than a sequential choice set-up and also allows us to compare the
behavior of chosen and unchosen players. Subjects’ information depended on the role they
were in: In each round, player A was only informed about the choice of the selected player
and the B or C player was only informed of A’s choice if he had been selected. In our view,
this information structure is quite natural since in many economic exchange situations the
terms of the implicit contract are typically not revealed to third parties. The outside payoff of
90 is dominated by the payoffs that a B/C player can obtain if he is chosen by A and chooses
0. At the same time, it is higher than what he gets if he is cooperating but exploited by A.
It is conceivable that the choice procedure used in RC-90 could have a separate effect on
behavior, perhaps eliciting a very studied, non-spontaneous reaction by B and C. To explore
this possibility we changed, in the condition denoted by RC-90DC (where DC refers to direct
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choice), the choice procedure, while leaving everything else as in RC-90. In RC-90DC the A
player first selects whether he will play with B or C, the chosen B/C player is then informed
about this, and then the two players make their choices between 0 and 10.
In our RC-10 condition we used the same choice procedure as in RC-90, but lowered the
payment of the unchosen player to 10. An intuitive conjecture is that this will lead to more
cooperation by B/C players, as being left out is now very costly to them.
The game-theoretic predictions based on the standard assumption of (common knowledge
of) rationality and narrow material self-interest differ across the conditions. For the NRC the
unique prediction is straightforward. Since the stage game has the incentive structure of a
prisoners’ dilemma game, both players choose 0 in the unique Nash equilibrium. Consequently,
the repeated game has also only one Nash equilibrium, which is subgame-perfect: both players
choose 0 in each round.
For the RCs the standard predictions are rather different. The stage-game now has two
Nash equilibria in pure strategies in which all three players involved choose action 0. The
equilbria differ in whether A chooses B or C as partner and they are not payoff-equivalent. As
a consequence of the latter, our finitely repeated RC games also have multiple subgame-perfect
Nash equilibria. One involves all three players choosing the non-cooperative choice in every
round. However, there are also numerous other subgame-perfect Nash equilibria involving
different levels of stable relations between player A and his partners and different degrees
of gains from cooperation for different players.5 The equilibria for RC-90 and RC-90DC
are the same. Lowering of the outside payoff to 10 as in RC-10 slightly enlarges the set of
subgame-perfect equilibria with cooperation. Hence, even under the standard game theoretic
assumptions there are subgame perfect Nash equilibria that imply considerable cooperation
in the different rivalry conditions, but not in the NRC.6
The theoretical prediction of multiple equilibria with and without gains from cooperation
in our RCs is akin to the findings of MacLeod and Malcomson (1989). They show that in
repeated labor relations without contractually complete effort enforcement many equilibria
exist. Some of them involve cooperation with rent extraction whereas others are equivalent
to the competitive Walrasian outcome without any rents.
5For details see the working paper version of our study (Brandts et al., 2008).
6Social or other-regarding preferences can transform the social dilemma games into coordination games
in all conditions and can therefore lead to cooperation in the RCs as well as the NRC. For instance, with
the type of distributional preferences posited by Fehr et al. (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000) both our stage games can have an equilibrium without cooperation, but also have equilibria
in which some subjects cooperate while others defect. Other models of social preferences like Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006) and Charness and Rabin (2002) predict similar patterns.
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Part 1 - Initial disposition towards others:. In part 1 we recorded participants’ decisions in the
circle test, which is a modified version of the ring-test (Liebrand, 1984) and was successfully
applied by Sonnemans et al. (2006). It is a task which allows for a quantification of people’s
disposition towards others by determining the readiness of individuals to help or hurt others
at some cost to themselves.
In the circle-test a person’s disposition towards another person is measured by a decision
which consists in the selection of a point on a circle. (For a visualization we refer the reader
to Brandts et al., 2008.) Each point on the circle represents an allocation of points to the
person who makes the choice (S) and to another person (O). Tracing the vertical projection
to the horizontal axis one can find the amount S obtains and tracing the horizontal projection
to the vertical axis one finds the quantity that O obtains. All amounts can be positive or
negative, with S2 + O2 = 10002. It is possible to choose S = 1000 and O = 0. Any other
choice of O leads to S < 1000. Importantly, in the experiment these numbers translate into
money earnings at the exchange rate of 1000 points equal to e 2,30. Hence, decisions in
the circle-test have pecuniary consequences. When presenting the results we will refer to
the chosen points in terms of the angle formed by the ray, which connects the chosen point
on the circumference to the origin, and the horizontal axis. For example, an angle of zero
degrees means selfish preferences, whereas 90 degrees means that one maximizes the other’s
payoff leaving nothing for oneself, and 45 degrees means equal positive payoffs. Angles larger
than 180 degrees are described as negative. For instance -90 degrees means to maximize the
other’s losses and keeping nothing for oneself, -45 degrees means keeping the same amount
the other loses, and a small negative angle represents keeping most of the money for oneself
while spending a little bit on taking away some money from the other person.7
In all conditions subjects had to make circle-test decisions with respect to other subjects.
Before the interactive phase of part 2 began and before even knowing the content of this phase,
thus also not knowing whether they were in the NRC or a rivalry condition, each subject chose
an angle with respect to one anonymously and randomly chosen other subject. These initial
angles towards a stranger measure the ‘social value orientation’ or the disposition towards
generalized others. Subjects were not informed about the decision of ‘their’ strangers in the
circle test until the very end of the session.
7The circle test has the advantages of allowing subjects to subtract from others payoffs in a symmetric way,
in the sense that giving, e.g., 10 points has the same material costs as taking away 10 points. Especially, in
our context where negative and positive emotions may come into play this seems to be an advantage over the
use of the more standard dictator game for eliciting social dispositions.In the experiment the circle appeared
on subjects’ computer screen. Subjects received computerized instructions about how to make the decision
and had ample opportunity to practice.
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Part 3 - Post-interaction well-being and disposition towards others:. In part 3 of the experi-
ment we measured the effects of the interaction in the game on subjects’ subjective well-being
and emotions8 as well as their dispositions towards others.
After the last round of the interactive game, and without knowing beforehand, subjects
had to respond to a computerized questionnaire designed to elicit participants’ subjective
well-being. They were asked to rate themselves with respect to a general subjective well-
being indicator as well as with respect to thirteen specific emotions.9 The questionnaire used
has previously successfully been applied by Bosman and van Winden (2002). We will explain
the general measure of subjective well-being and the emotions questionnaire in detail when
we present the results on them in Section 3.2.
To measure the impact of interaction experience on the disposition towards others, subjects
had to make two new circle-test decisions, right after answering the questionnaires. In the RCs
each subject chose angles regarding each of the two other subjects in the triad. In the NRC
each subject made one choice regarding his partner and—to keep the number of decisions
constant across conditions—another choice regarding a randomly chosen third anonymous
subject.10
In summary, our discussion leads us to the following main working hypotheses. First, in
the interactive game, standard theory predicts either the same or more cooperation (i.e., effi-
ciency) in treatments with rivalry and either no earnings advantage or an earnings advantage
of the A player; the results pertaining to this hypothesis are presented in Section 3.1. Second,
we hypothesize that experience of rivalry has a negative effect on subjective well-being and
on disposition towards others of the B/C players who can be excluded from the interaction;
this is analyzed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. Third, we expect that interaction success in terms
of monetary earnings, the presence of rivalry and the player role together with the subjective
well-being and emotions interact in affecting players social post-game disposition towards
others; this is what we study in Section 3.4.
8We use the notion subjective well-being similarly to Kahneman et al.’s (1997) notion of ‘experienced
utility’, which goes back to Bentham. As these authors we claim that ’subjective well-being’ is both measurable
and empirically distinct from standard decision utility. For discussions about the role and importance of
feelings and emotions in economic contexts, see Loewenstein (2000), Lawler and Thye (1999) and Elster
(1998).
9According to Robinson and Clore (2002), self-reports are the most common and potentially the best way
to measure a person’s emotional experience. Alesina et al. (2004), Blanchflower and Oswald (2004), and
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005) are examples of recent studies of well-being that use self-reports. A recent account
of the usefulness of such measures of subjective well-being for policy evaluation is provided by Krueger (2005).
For an experimental study using self-reported happiness measures, see Charness and Grosskopf (2001).
10The instructions of the experiment can be downloaded from
http://www.fee.uva.nl/creed/pdffiles/instr2compwellbe.pdf.
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3. Results
We collected data for 293 subjects. Each subject participated in only one session. For the
NRC 72 subjects participated in 36 dyads in four NRC sessions. We conducted four sessions
with each of the three RCs. We had 81 subjects in RC-90, 75 in RC-90DC and 66 in RC-10.
We have, therefore, 26 [36]11, 27, 25 and 22 statistically independent observations for the
different conditions. All sessions were run computerized at the CREED laboratory at the
University of Amsterdam. The average (net of show-up fee) earnings per subject was e 23,–.
A typical session lasted approximately 90 minutes.
We start with the results related to material efficiency and earnings in the different treat-
ments. Main findings will be formulated in terms of a number of specific results.12
3.1. Rivalry, efficiency and earnings
Figure 2 shows for all four treatments the development of average cooperation rates over
actually played games (plays), ignoring decisions of non-chosen B/C players in the RCs. This
also represents attained efficiency levels in terms of earnings. Recall that 10 is the cooperative
choice and 0 the non-cooperative one.
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Figure 2: Development of the level of cooperation (efficiency)
in the NRC and the three Rivalry Conditions
For all four series no large variations across rounds are observed, except for a rather
stark end-game effect, common to all conditions.13 Result 1 summarizes the comparisons of
cooperation levels across conditions as well as earnings across conditions and player types.
11For the NRC we have complete data for only 52 participants (26 pairs). For the other 20 participants we
have all information except the decisions in the first circle test. This was due to computer problems in one of
the NRC sessions.
12This is an abridged version of our obtained results. For a more detailed report and analysis, see the
working paper version (Brandts et al., 2008).
13Such an end-game effect has been found in many other experiments on public goods and social dilemma
games. It does not affect our main results.
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Result 1.
A. There is no significant difference between cooperation levels in the NRC and in the actual
plays in each of the three RCs.
B. There is no significant difference in earnings between players in the NRC and A players
in the RCs. The same holds for earnings of NRC players and the selected B or C players in
each of the RCs.
C. In each of the three RCs the variation (across rounds) in earnings of A players is signifi-
cantly larger than for players in the NRC.
Part A of Result 1 states that rivalry does not lead to efficiency gains in terms of earnings.
For the NRC the cooperation level and dynamics are in keeping with those observed in similar
social dilemma games (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Keser and van Winden, 2000) the average
level of cooperation is 7.04 and the standard deviation is 3.39. For RC-90, RC-10, and RC-
90DC these figures are 6.71 and 3.06, 5.92 and 3.15, and 6.33 and 3.07, respectively. A
Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject equality of the distributions (p = .1379).14 All results
remain qualitatively the same when the last two rounds are excluded.
Part B of Result 1 summarizes our finding that the A players in the different RCs can not
utilize their seemingly powerful position to earn more than players in the NRC. When rivalry
is absent, average per round earnings of players are 252.2. With rivalry the A players’ average
earnings per round are 251.6 in RC-90, 257.8 in RC-10 and 249.24 in RC-90DC. A Kruskal-
Wallis test does not reject the hypothesis that these earnings are equal in all four treatments
(p = .6020). Similar comparisons can be made between the NRC earnings and the earnings
of actually chosen B/C players in the RCs. Interestingly, the average per round earnings of
the chosen B/C players are in all RCs lower than in the NRC (RC-90: 242.9; RC-10: 216.3;
RC-90DC: 235.4), though a Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject the null hypothesis of equality
of distributions (p = .2096). Overall, across conditions, differences in earnings are minor and
statistically insignificant.
Part C of Result 1 documents a surprising feature of the interaction under rivalry. In each
rivalry treatment the (across rounds) standard deviation of earnings of A players is larger
than the (across rounds) standard deviation for players in the NRC (NRC: 65.43 (n=72); RC-
90: 89.59 (n=27); RC-10: 94.95 (n=22); RC-90DC: 93.08 (n=25); p = .0005, Kruskal-Wallis
test). Pair-wise Mann-Whitney tests reject the hypothesis of no difference between NRC and
any of the three RCs (p ≤ .0008).
14The Kruskal-Wallis test tests the hypothesis that the four independent samples are drawn from the same
population. Where appropriate we use the Mann-Whitney (Wilcoxon signed-ranks) test for independent
samples (matched pairs) (Siegel and Castellan, 1988). If not otherwise indicated all test statistics are two-
sided (corrected for ties) and the unit of observation is the group (average). In all cases, the alternative—but
because of the required normality assumption problematic—t-test gives qualitatively the same results. To
save on space we do not report these t-test statistics.
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A conservative interpretation of Result 1 is that rivalry has at least no positive implications
for the allocation of resources. The fact that in many exchange environments the short side
obtains a large part of the available surplus is usually considered to have the allocative virtue
of attracting resources to that side. This incentive seems not to be present in our environment,
if one compares the short side’s earnings with that of the NRC. In addition, the fact that the
standard deviation of earnings is higher for the A players in any of the RCs in comparison to
the NRC shows that being on the short side in the RCs is not such a favorable position as one
might expect, intuitively and theoretically. In fact, rivalry leads to more income uncertainty
for agents on the short side of the exchange relation, without generating an income increase.15
An important question emerging from the above results is, why does the A player not profit
from the rivalry between B and C? An answer may be found in A’s partner choice behavior.
If A could commit to always changing his interaction partner after the partner having chosen
0 and never switching after the partner having chosen 10, then he might be able to capitalize
on his advantageous position. However, since such a commitment is not possible, uncertainty
about A’s future behavior may lead the B/C players to act opportunistically; i.e., choosing
0 even after successful cooperation in a round. In consonance with this, A may sometimes
switch away from a partner who chose 10. Together, this could lead to a dilution of A’s
seemingly advantageous situation.
Indeed, in all three rivalry conditions, A’s rewarding and punishment behavior is not fully
consistent. When both the A player and the chosen partner have made the cooperative choice
10 in a round t − 1, the A player does frequently not reward the partner, since A either
switches partner or stays with the partner but changes to choice 0. Similarly, if the chosen
B/C player did not cooperate in a round t−1, while A did cooperate, the A player often does
not punish this behavior. Another mode of behavior that is likely to increase efficiency and
earnings is conditional cooperative behavior (Keser and van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al.,
2001). We find that compared to the NRC the behavior of the A players in the RCs is less
conditionally cooperative, especially regarding cooperative choices. In particular, a choice of
10 by player A in round t, following the partner’s choice of 10 in round t− 1, is significantly
less likely in the RCs than in the NRC.16
These results are consistent with the idea that A players are indeed in a relatively strong
position in the RCs. However, since they are not consistently sanctioning defective and re-
15The number of times an A player chose the same partner correlated positively with A’s earnings in those
plays in all three RCs. Similarly, for those B/C players who are chosen more often by the A player, the
number of times they are chosen correlates positively with their earnings in those plays in all three RCs. For a
more detailed analysis of the relation between stability of relations and earnings see the working paper version
(Brandts et al., 2008).
16For a thorough discussion of reciprocity and conditional cooperation please consult Brandts et al. (2008).
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warding cooperative behavior of their chosen partners they can not benefit from this structural
advantage. In consequence, rivalry does neither increase efficiency nor materially favor the
short side of the exchange relation.
3.2. Subjective well-being after the interaction
In this and the next section we will discuss subjects’ well-being and disposition towards
others, respectively. In Section 3.4 we will relate these results with the results from the
interactive game.
We use both a general measure and a list of specific emotions to elicit participants’ sub-
jective well-being. For measuring general subjective well-being we used Figure 3. After the
interaction phase, subjects were asked to indicate the number below the little figures that
best corresponded to their general mood in relation to the facial expressions of the so-called
Self-Assessment Manikin.17
Figure 3: General measure of subjective well-being
In the figure, a “1” clearly corresponds to the highest level and a “9” to the lowest level
of subjective well-being. For a better comparison with the emotions scores reported below,
we have inverted the score obtained from subjects’ decisions in Figure 3, so that “1” reflects
the worst and “9” the best mood. Table 2 shows the average values of the general well-being
measure for the NRC and the RCs, pooled as well as separately. Result 2 summarizes the
results of these comparisons for the NRC, the pooled RCs, and the different player roles.
Result 2.
A. For players in the NRC general subjective well-being is lower than for A players, higher
than for less often chosen B/C players and not different from more often chosen B/C players,
in the Rivalry Conditions.
B. In the Rivalry Conditions, for A players general subjective well-being is higher than for
both more and less often chosen B/C players.
C. In the Rivalry Conditions, for more often chosen B/C players general subjective well-being
is higher than for less often chosen B/C players.
17These figures, developed by Lang (1980), are reprinted from Sonnemans (1991).
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Table 2: Averages of general measure of subjective well-being across conditions and roles
condition-role
well-being RC:A RC:B/C-m.o. RC:B/C-l.o. NRC
All RC general well-beinga,b,c,d,f 7.53 6.35 3.83 6.40
no. of obs 74 73† 74 72
RC-90 general well-beinga,b,c,d,f 7.85 6.09 3.50
RC-10 general well-beinga,b,c,d,f 7.72 5.81 3.73
RC-90DC general well-beingb,c,f 7.00 7.08 4.28
no. of obs 22 22† 27
Note: Scores for well-being range from 1 (feel “very bad”) to 9 (feel “very good”). “m.o.” (“l.o.”)
stands for “more (less) often chosen”. a significant difference between RC:A and RC:B/C-m.o.,
b significant difference between RC:A and RC:B/C-l.o., c significant difference between RC:B/C-m.o.
and RC:B/C-l.o., d significant difference between RC:A and NRC, e significant difference between
RC:B/C-m.o. and NRC, f significant difference between RC:BC-l.o. and NRC; all significances at
least at 2.5 percent level, Mann-Whitney rank sum tests, one-sided; † n = 21 in RC-10 due to one
missing observation.
Support for this result can be found in Table 2. In the table the superscripts indicate
significant differences of pairwise comparisons across player situations and conditions, as
explained in the note to the table. For the pooled data all pairwise comparisons are significant
(at least at the 2.5 percent level, one-sided tests), with the only exception of the difference
between players in the NRC and the more often chosen B/C players in the RCs. For RC-90
and RC-10 the same pairwise comparisons as for the pooled data appear to be significant.
Note, that for these two conditions the levels of our general measure of subjective well-being
are different between all three player situations. Being on the short or long side does make a
difference for subjective well-being, independent of the earnings obtained outside the relation.
Those on the long side feel significantly worse than players on the short side. Moreover, being
mostly excluded on the long side has an additional negative impact on subjective well-being.
Observe also that, in comparison to the NRC, the reported scores of our general measure in
the RC-90 and RC-10 conditions are at a higher, a lower and a similar level, depending on the
position of the players. Hence, rivalry has led to an inequality in subjective well-being without
generating material efficiency gains. For the RC-90DC the results are slightly different as the
comparison between RC-A and both RC-B/C m.o. and NRC are not significant, while all
other differences stay significant also in this condition.
Next to the general measure of subjective well-being subjects also reported the experienced
intensity of a number of specific emotions. As expected, negative emotions (sadness, envy,
anger, irritation, contempt) are negatively correlated with general well-being while positive
emotions (happiness, pride, joy, relief) correlate positively with this measure (p < .025 for
all mentioned emotions, using the pooled data from the Rivalry Conditions). These results
support the interpretation that our general measure indeed indicates how people feel and
demonstrates the close relation between subjective well-being in a more general sense and the
intensity of experienced specific emotions.
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3.3. Disposition towards others before and after the interaction
Table 3 presents the averages and standard deviations of the angles observed in the circle
tests of parts 1 and 3, for the NRC and the RCs, pooled as well as separately. We refer to the
chosen angles in part 1 (part 3) as initial (final) angles. For the RCs we distinguish between
player types and, for the B/C players, between more often (m.o.) and less often (l.o.) chosen
ones.
In line with earlier studies using social value orientation tests in economic experiments
(Offerman et al., 1996), we find that many people are initially positively inclined towards
anonymous others. Unsurprisingly, initial angles do not significantly differ between treat-
ments. On average the angles are 15.37 degrees in the NRC and 14.01, 15.75, and 18.54
in the three RCs (cf. left part of Table 3).18 A Kruskal-Wallis test does not reject the
hypothesis that the angles come from the same population (p = .3937). There is also no sta-
tistically significant difference in initial angles between those subjects who—without knowing
it beforehand—became an A player and those who became a B/C player in the three RCs
(p ≥ .6333, Mann-Whitney test).
Next consider the final angles shown on the right part of Table 3. These angles were
measured after the interaction phase and, hence, are payoff relevant expressions of post-
interaction disposition towards others. Our main interest is in whether and how rivalry
and experience during the interaction phase affect people’s disposition towards others. We,
therefore, focus on changes relative to the initial angles. With the notable exception of A
players behavior towards more often chosen B/C players, we observe a general tendency for
angles to decrease from the pre-game to the post-game situation, in all conditions. Such a
general ‘decay’ is in keeping with the results of van Dijk et al. (2002). Importantly, however,
the observed changes clearly differ between the NRC and the RCs as well as between player
roles. The pattern of these differences is summarized in the following result.19
Result 3. Compared to the disposition towards others before the interactive game:
A. In the NRC, players’ disposition towards their partners do not significantly change, whereas
it exhibits a significant decrease towards third parties.
B. In the RCs, A players’ disposition towards the more often chosen partner does not signif-
icantly change, but significantly decreases towards the less often chosen partner.
C. In the RCs, the more often chosen B/C players’ disposition towards A players and less
often chosen B/C players significantly decreases.
D. In the RCs, the less often chosen B/C players’ disposition towards A players and more
often chosen B/C players significantly decreases.
18An angle of 15 degrees implies a transfer of 259 points to the other person, whereas 966 points are kept.
19To save on space, for the RCs the result refers to the pooled data. The few differences between the
RCs are discussed after the result. All p-values reported for the statistical support of this result come from
Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests.
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Table 3: Disposition towards others - average angles in the circle tests
initial angle of final angle of
all all A A B/C-m.o. B/C-m.o. B/C-l.o. B/C-l.o.
all A B/C B/C-m.o. B/C-l.o. towards towards towards towards towards towards towards towards
(all) partner third party B/C-m.o. B/C-l.o. A B/C-l.o. A B/C-m.o.
NRC 15.37 10.67 9.68
(18.40) (24.17) (15.49)
[n=52]a [n=52]c [n=52]c
All RC 16.07 16.02 16.10 18.38 13.81 16.92 10.17 9.98 11.74 -2.97 6.38
(21.84) (18.73) (23.28) (18.85) (26.66) (19.64) (18.71) (20.39) (18.16) (27.48) (16.51)
[n=221]b [n=73]b [n=148] [n=74] [n=74] [n=73]d [n=73]d [n=74] [n=74] [n=74] [n=74]
RC-90 14.01 14.90 13.58 19.20 7.96 14.54 6.93 12.49 12.59 -4.19 5.95
(26.03) (19.43) (28.83) (21.99) (33.81) (20.14) (14.40) (19.24) (16.79) (27.03) (13.61)
[n=80]b [n=26]b [n=54] [n=27] [n=27] [n=26]d [n=26]d [n=27] [n=27] [n=27] [n=27]
RC-10 15.75 15.60 15.84 18.75 12.93 16.28 12.36 10.80 11.13 -2.84 7.69
(19.48) (20.17) (19.36) (17.94) (20.48) (18.77) (17.94) (19.75) (16.49) (20.45) (13.72)
[n=66] [n=22] [n=44] [n=22] [n=22] [n=22] [n=22] [n=22] [n=22] [n=22] [n=22]
RC-90DC 18.54 17.56 19.03 17.18 20.89 19.97 11.60 6.55 11.36 -1.77 5.68
(18.73) (17.29) (19.56) (16.50) (21.57) (20.25) (23.11) (22.41) (21.42) (33.70) (21.50)
[n=75] [n=25] [n=50] [n=25] [n=25] [n=25] [n=25] [n=25] [n=25] [n=25] [n=25]
Note: “m.o.” (“l.o.”) stands for “more (less) often chosen; a observations of one session are missing due to technical problems; b one missing observation in RC-90;
c without observations that correspond to the missing observations in the first circle test (see a); d without observation that corresponds to the missing observation
in the first circle test (see b); in cases where both B/C players are chosen exactly 15 times the average angles of the two players is used when calculating the angles
for the “more often” and “less often” chosen players. Standard deviations in parentheses.
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In the NRC, the hypothesis of equality of distributions of initial angles and final angles
towards the partner is not rejected (p = .1775). In contrast, when comparing initial angles
with final angles towards the third party the null hypothesis of equality is rejected (p = .0132).
In the RCs we need to distinguish between A players and more and less often chosen B/C
players. In the following we present the test results for the pooled data of all RCs and mention
the results for an individual Rivalry Condition only if it differs from the pooled pattern.
Part B of the above result captures the A players’ changes in dispositions towards interaction
partners. Compared to their initial disposition, A players do not significantly modify their
disposition towards the more often chosen partner (p = .7734). In stark contrast, concerning
the less often chosen partner the final angles decrease significantly (p = .0005). For RC-90DC
this decrease is large in absolute terms, but statistically not significant (p = .1523).
For the more often chosen B/C players (part C) equality of distributions of initial angles
and final angles towards A players is rejected (p = .0009). However, for RC-90 the decrease is
insignificant (p = .1650) and only marginally significant for RC-10 (p = .0593), indicating that
the result is mostly driven by RC-90DC. When comparing the initial angle of B/C players
with the final angle regarding the less often chosen B/C fellow equality of distributions is
rejected (p = .0019). On the individual RC level the differences are at best only marginally
significant, though (RC-90: p = .0552; RC-10: p = .0856).
For the less often chosen B/C players (part D) equality of distributions of initial and the
final angles regarding the A-player is rejected (p < .0001). Note, that the negative angles
(average: −2.97) implies that less often chosen B/C players gave up money in order to reduce
the earnings of A-players. When comparing the initial angle with the final angle towards more
often chosen B/C fellow players we also observe a significant decrease (p = .0018). Among
the individual RCs the observed decrease is statistically not significant in RC-90 (p = .4178).
A general insight from the findings of this and the previous section is that subjective well-
being and dispositions towards others are strongly influenced by the interaction institution
and the role in which a person participates in the interactive game. In particular, being on
the long side of the exchange situation has a strong negative effect on players’ subjective
well-being and their disposition towards other players, especially those on the short side.20
3.4. The relation of interaction experience, post-interaction well-being and disposition towards
others
In this section we briefly report on the results of a regression analysis that studies how well-
being, experienced emotions and interaction success are related to the post-game disposition
20We do not study the potentially important issue of gender effects. For an interesting study of the relation
between competition and gender, see Niederle and Vesterlund (2007).
15
towards others. We presume the following relations: (i) well-being and emotions are influenced
by experience in the game, that is, by both, the interaction success in monetary terms and the
position a player is in; (ii) the disposition towards others after the interaction is affected by
interaction success but also by emotional factors, which allows for an indirect—via interaction
success—as well as direct effect of emotions on the disposition towards others.21 In the
following we concentrate on the NRC and the pooled data of all three Rivalry Conditions.
For general well-being and each specific emotion we ran separate OLS regressions with
interaction success, measured as sum of earnings across actual plays, as explanatory variable.
For subjects in NRC general well-being, the positive emotions happiness, pride, and joy and
the negative emotions sadness, envy, anger, and irritation are strongly significantly related
to interaction success, with the expected signs (p < .01). In addition, surprise shows a
significantly negative sign (p < .01). These results indicate that the emotional state of NRC
players is strongly correlated with their earnings success in the incomplete contract game.
The picture turns out to be different in the Rivalry Conditions. For the A players general
well-being is significantly positively related to interaction success in plays with the more often
chosen B/C player (p < .01) but marginally negatively related to interaction success with the
less often chosen player (p < .1). Of the specific emotions the positive emotions happiness,
relief, and joy are positively and the negative emotion anger is negatively correlated with
interaction success in plays with the more often chosen B/C player (p < .01). Interaction
success in plays with the less often chosen B/C player has no significant effect on any of the
specific emotions. Hence, for players on the short side in the RCs interaction success shows a
weaker relation with the emotional state and general subjective well-being.
While for B/C players interaction success and general well-being are positively correlated
and similar for more and less often chosen ones (p < .01 and p < .05, respectively), the
effect for the specific emotions differs strongly. More often chosen B/C players’ positive
emotions (happiness, pride, relief, joy) and negative emotions (sadness, envy, anger, irritation,
contempt) are significantly (p < .05) related to interaction success, with the expected sign.
In contrast, for the less often chosen B/C players the negative emotions sadness and anger
indicate a significantly negative correlation with interaction success (p < .05), while all other
specific emotions seem unrelated to this experience.
In the following, we explore how emotions and interaction success relate to the disposition
towards others. Due to the substantial correlations among the experienced emotions, we
21As a referee pointed out, we cannot completely rule out the possibility that post-game dispositions towards
others are to some extent ex-post rationalizations of the earlier elicited emotions. However, our results are not
invariant between the NRC and the Rivalry Conditions (see below), indicating that ex-post rationalizations
are unlikely to be an important explanation of the relations we find. Recall also that choices in the circle test
are incentivized.
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performed a factor analysis to identify the main dimensions for a regression analysis. It turns
out that for all four player-roles only three factors had eigenvalues larger than 1, and together
accounted for more than 60% of the variance of the thirteen emotion items. For the first
factor the factor loadings were high for the negative emotions anger, sadness, irritation, and
contempt; for the second factor they were high for the positive emotions joy, happiness, and
pride; for the third factor they were high for the emotions guilt, shame, and fear. We call
these three factors the anger factor, the joy factor and the guilt factor, for obvious reasons.22
We examined models of seemingly unrelated regressions for the NRC and the pooled data
of the RCs and all player roles. In the regression models the independent variable is the
disposition towards others after the game (final angle), and the explanatory variables are the
initial disposition towards others (initial angle), the interaction success (sum of earnings over
plays), and the three emotion factors just described.
Table 4 presents the regression results.23 In the NRC we need to distinguish between
changes of disposition towards the partner in the interactive game and the randomly chosen
third player. In the table, the left column pertains to the partner in the interactive game and
the right column relates to the third player. The results show that in the NRC interaction
success has no significant effect. In contrast, the disposition towards the interaction partner
is significantly negatively affected by the anger factor and significantly positively affected by
the guilt factor. The disposition towards the third party is unaffected by emotional factors,
indicating that the emotions are directed towards the partner in the interactive game. To-
gether with the result that the emotions of players in the NRC are correlated with interaction
success the overall picture is consistent with the idea that interaction success triggers emo-
tional responses, which in turn, determine people’s post-interaction disposition towards their
interaction partner. Note, that the effect of earnings on the final disposition towards the
interaction partner is only indirect and mediated by the emotions.24
The next two columns in Table 4 show regression results for the A players in the RCs.
Now the left column relates to the more often chosen and the right column to the less often
chosen B/C player. The initial disposition towards others has a significantly positive effect
22The criteria we use for selecting the factors are two of the most widely used conventions. There were
some minor variations of the factor loadings across player types. The complete list of factor loadings can be
obtained from the authors upon request.
23For each condition and player position, we have run three nested regression models, one with only in-
teraction success as independent variable, one with only the emotion factors as independent variables, and a
third with both types of variables included, next to the initial angle and a constant. Likelihood ratio tests
indicate that the specification presented here performs best. The working paper version (Brandts et al. 2008)
discusses all regressions in more detail.
24Such a mediator effect is well known in social psychology research (Baron and Kenny, 1986).
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Table 4: Determinants of post-game disposition towards others -
in No Rivalry and Rivalry Conditions
A/B players in NRC A players in the RC’s B/C-m.o. in the RC’s B/C-l.o. in the RC’s
towards towards towards towards
B/A 3rd party B/C-m.o. B/C-l.o. A B/C-l.o. A B/C-m.o.
Initial disposition .3158 .3654∗∗ .2990∗ .2491∗ .3975∗∗ .5550∗∗ .5171∗∗ .2277∗∗
(.065) (.001) (.023) (.038) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001)
Interaction success -.0326 .0004 .0014 .0017 .0012
(.616) (.765) (.369) (.156) (.625)
Anger factor -7.404∗ -1.117 1.526 2.701 -5.115∗ .5921 -8.338∗∗ .2199
(.016) (.508) (.515) (.195) (.045) (.731) (.002) (.903)
Joy factor 4.015 2.825 1.865 1.387 -1.317 .3572 1.904 1.990
(.226) (.136) (.433) (.514) (.583) (.835) (.488) (.284)
Guilt factor 6.290∗ 1.903 2.335 5.319∗ 1.207 -2.875 4.802 -.6343
(.027) (.286) (.334) (.017) (.562) (.096) (.072) (.728)
Constant 13.84 4.056 9.941 3.746 -6.899 1.287 -12.10∗ 3.233
(.410) (.089) (.209) (.325) (.335) (.589) (.017) (.115)
R2 .3194 .3478 .1217 .1981 .2872 .3719 .3809 .1733
N 52 52 73 73 73 73 74 74
Note: Seemingly unrelated regressions; ∗∗ significant at the 1 percent level, ∗ significant at the 5 percent level; p−values (2-sided) between
parentheses.
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whereas interaction success has no significant effect. The guilt factor is significantly positively
related with the disposition towards the less often chosen B/C players. This indicates that
feelings of guilt, shame, and fear increased the disposition of the A players towards those B/C
players they have frequently excluded during the game. Since the emotions of A players in the
RCs are not affected by interaction success with the less often chosen B/C player, their post-
game disposition is neither directly nor indirectly (via the emotions) influenced by interaction
success. Next to the initial disposition, only the emotion factor guilt is an important direct
determinant for the final disposition towards the interaction partner on the long side of the
exchange relation.
The right side of Table 4 shows the results for the more often chosen B/C players and
for the less often chosen ones. Here the left columns refer to the A player and the right
columns to the other B/C player. We discuss the regression results for both kinds of B/C
players together. Next to the initial disposition, the post-game disposition towards the A
players is strongly and significantly negatively influenced by the anger factor, indicating that
negative feelings strongly decrease their kindness towards the player on the short side of the
interaction, but not towards their co-players on the long side. For the more often chosen
B/C player we identify a pronounced mediator effect of the anger factor. Interaction success
influences the disposition of more often chosen B/C players towards A players only indirectly
via the emotions constituting this factor (that is, it loses its significance if emotions are added
to the regression). For the less often chosen B/C players we neither find a significant direct
relation between the emotions entering the anger factor and interaction success nor is there a
significant direct effect of interaction success on the disposition towards A players. Together,
this shows that the post-game disposition of more often excluded players on the long side is
directly negatively affected by their negative emotional feelings.25 The next result summarizes
our findings in this section.
Result 4. In all conditions and for all player roles the final disposition towards others is
positively related to the initial disposition. In addition, the following holds for the final dispo-
sition towards others:
A. For players in the NRC it is related only indirectly to interaction success, mediated by the
emotion factors of anger and guilt.
B. For the A players in the RCs it is neither directly nor indirectly related to interaction
success, but towards the less often chosen B/C player it is positively related to the guilt factor.
25One might speculate that the desire to reduce earnings inequalities drives the final disposition of the less
often chosen B/C players towards their richer A players. To test this we have also run regressions where we
included the total earnings across plays (as well as across rounds) of the less often chosen B/C player relative
to the earnings of the A player as a measure of interaction success. None of these alternative measures
of interaction success is significant, neither when used separately nor when used jointly. In all alternative
specifications the anger factor stays significant at the 1 percent level. Hence, for our results the explanation
that less often chosen B/C players punish A players because of earnings inequalities has no bite.
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C. For the more often chosen B/C players in the RCs the final disposition towards the A
players is indirectly related to interaction success via the anger emotion factor.
D. For the less often chosen B/C players in the RCs the final disposition towards the A play-
ers is neither directly nor indirectly related to interaction success but is strongly negatively
influenced by the emotion factor of anger.
From Section 3.2 we know that the general subjective well-being of players strongly de-
pends on the competitiveness of the institution players are put in as well as their position
in the competitive environment. We have also seen that interaction success, measured by
earnings, is insufficient to explain these differences. The above result shows that emotional
states rather than pure monetary outcomes are related to behavior after the interaction in
the game. In summary, mediated by the emotional state, the experience with rivalry as such
and the role people are immersed in are important determinants of the disposition towards
others, while interaction success plays only an indirect and partial role.
4. Final Comments
We find that rivalry matters, but in a very different way than is typically assumed in
economics. In our experimental exchange environment without complete contracts rivalry
does neither enhance efficiency nor does it increase the earnings of the short side of the
exchange relation. It does have positive effects on the subjective well-being of people on the
short side. However, rivalry has hidden costs that are related to people’s emotional reaction
to lack of control and the possibility of exclusion from trade. Being exposed to a competitive
environment lowers subjective well-being and triggers negative emotions for those on the long
side. Rivalry has also adverse effects on the behavioral disposition towards those interacted
with. Experience with rivalry appears to decrease the subsequent willingness to help. This
effect is strongest for those who are frequently excluded. Importantly, these effects can not
be explained by earnings differences generated during the interaction alone, but are strongly
related to experienced emotions.
One can speculate about potential longer term effects of experienced rivalry. In our study,
rivalry leads to a deterioration of the social relations between interaction partners and con-
siderably depresses the subjective well-being of those on the long side of exchange who are
often excluded from interaction. These facts may lead to the obstruction of future coopera-
tion. Note, that the formation of mostly stable bilateral relations can not completely solve
this problem, because in most competitive situations bilateral relations necessarily imply the
exclusion of some parties from materially beneficial interactions. Additionally, in a dynamic
society established bilateral relations will not hold forever. When interactions between new
partners have to take place, they may bring together parties with a negative disposition to-
wards others. In addition, the subjective well-being of those parties that have previously
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been frequently excluded from the interaction may be low. This in turn may feed back to
individuals’ behavior with possibly adverse effects on efficiency. In line with this reasoning,
Okada and Riedl (2005) find that in the related context of coalitional bargaining exclusion
frequently takes place leading to unfair and inefficient outcomes.
Our study connects with recent papers providing new perspectives on rivalry. Brown et
al. (2004) examine the emergence of fixed long-term partnerships between workers and firms
under incomplete contracting. They find that—due to contract incompleteness—the market
place resembles a collection of bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market. In
a related vein, Kirchsteiger et al. (2005) study how market institutions endogenously emerge.
In a more general sense, our evidence is in favor of the view that socio-psychological
influences and those aspects of human interaction mostly related to material welfare and
pecuniary incentives can (and should) not always be kept apart or disentangled. Granovetter
(1985) refers to this as the embeddedness of economic activity in social relations. Interpersonal
rivalry can hurt the social relations which are necessary for the successful pursuit of material
wealth. Our results add to, but are different from, the criticism of market economies put
forward by Lane (1991, 2000). His point is, that in market economies people are drawn into
striving too much for material things at the expense of companionship. Our contribution
consists in providing evidence of the social and affective costs of rivalry as such. In broad
terms our results here relate to the work of Bohnet et al. (2001), Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002)
and Be´nabou and Tirole (2003).
Clearly, our research does not cast light on every facet of rivalry, as for example, the
relation between competition and the efficient allocation of resources. Other settings and
institutional environments should be investigated. An interesting paper in this respect is
Falk et al. (2008) who show that the successful use of tournaments by firms depends on
institutional details like the possibility of sabotage.
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